The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Authorized Edition)
by National Commission on Terrorist Attacks

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Book Reviews of The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Authorized Edition)

Book Review: A Critical Self-Evaluation of a Deadly Systemic Failure
Summary: 5 Stars

The incredible systemic failures leading up to 9/11 and its aftermath are far too important for readers in the U.S. or abroad to view this Report solely through the distorting, finger-pointing prism of our/their own received dogma. As set out in the Report's Preface, "[w]e have come together with a unity of purpose because our nation demands it." It is perhaps useful to keep that in mind when reading the Report/

The report is divided into 13 sections. The first is a well-written account of the four American and United Airlines flights whose tragic outcomes form the centerpiece of 9/11. The impact of the section is heightened by the spare prose. The opening paragraphs ends: "For those heading to an airport, weather conditions could not have been better for a safe and pleasant journey. Among the travelers were Mohamed Atta and Abdul Aziz al Omari, who arrived at the airport in Portland, Maine." The Report does not shy way from deploring the confused, delayed reaction of federal agencies to the unfolding tragedy. In analyzing certain government emergency protocols the report concludes that "on the morning of 9/11, the existing protocol was unsuited in every respect for what was about to happen." Damning words.

The next three sections provide an overview of the foundation of the 'new terrorism' and the U.S.'s initial responses to Al Qaeda's initial assaults against the U.S. The treatment of these issues, particularly the background information setting out the socio-political milieu that allowed Al Qaeda to grow and flourish attempts is designed clearly to be as objective as possible. Many may disagree as to whether the Report succeeds in this attempt. The Report does not hesitate to set out the systemic failures that hindered the government's ability to analyze properly the data it received on terrorists in the years leading up to 9/11. Plans to strengthen strategic analysis faltered because "the FBI had little appreciation for the role of analysis." Further, the culture of the intelligence community hindered analysis because "access depended in large part on an analyst's personal relationships with individuals in the operational units" where the information resided. Congress and the White House are not spared. They "had a distinct tendency to push questions of emerging national security threats off its own plate, leaving them for others to consider."

The account of the bombing of the al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in the Sudan is telling. The attack was made despite the caution National Security Advisor Sandy Berger received from the National Security Council that the link between Al Qaeda and the al Shifa plant was uncertain. This air strike, coming in the midst of the Clinton scandals that unleashed a torrent of wag-the-dog commentary. The Report asserts that "the wag the dog slur, the intense partisanship of the period, and the [sparse] nature of the al Shifa evidence likely had a cumulative effect on future decisions about the use of force against Bin Ladin.

The report's next sections focus on Al Qaeda's strategy to attack the U.S. domestically. They focus on three key operatives, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, Risuan Isamuddin, and Abd al Rahim al Nashiri and Al Qaeada's and their decision to use planes as a weapon to create mass casualties. It is sometimes difficult to determine what information was available before 9/11 and what became available post-attack. In describing the U.S. training the terrorists received here the Report provides a glimpse into the avoidable: "Other instructors who worked with Hazmi and Mihdar remember them as poor students who focused on learning to control the aircraft in flight but took no interest in takeoffs or landings." The section concludes with these chilling words: "The plan that started with a proposal by KSM in 1996 had evolved to overcome numerous obstacles. Now 19 men waited in nondescript hotel rooms to board four flights the next morning.

The next section describes the obvious warning signals that were blinking madly at anyone prepared to listen and act. The text of the Presidential Daily Brief dated 6 August 2001 is headed: 'Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in U.S.' The Report states that the 11 September attack fell into the void between the foreign and domestic threats. On at least 4 occasions in 2001 the CIA and the FBI had opportunities to focus on the significance of two of the hijackers but failed to do so. These and other glaring intelligence gaps are the focus of the Report's recommendations.

The Report goes on to provide a detailed description of the attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon, the horrific events that ensued, and the emergency response. It is not for the feeble-hearted.

The remainder of the Report focuses on the Commission's analysis and recommendations. The Report's summary is set out succinctly: "We believe the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of failures: in imagination, policy, capabilities, and management." The Report's recommendations flow logically from there.

The key question people in the U.S. should address with regard to the Report's recommendations is simple: Do they have the will to set aside party ideology to make that nation safer or will they use the Report primarily to win debating points in Congress or in the press? If the tone and nature of the public and media driven response to the Report are any indication the answer may not be positive.

An executive summary is available for those who do not want to read the entire Report

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