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Victory 1918 by Alan Palmer
Book Summary InformationAuthor: Alan Palmer Edition: Paperback Audio: English (Unknown); English (Original Language); English (Published) Published: 2001-02-27 ISBN: 0802137873 Number of pages: 384 Publisher: Grove Press
Book Reviews of Victory 1918Book Review: ...toying with beliefs.... Summary: 5 Stars
Britain has always had her eyes wide open to keep the/her routes to India wide open exclusively for her commerce, and Britain acquisition of the Suez Canal and her subsequent colonization -1882 - (a so-called mandate) of Egypt was the culmination of such entrepreneurship.
For the routes to India, Britain may have initially sold her soul more out of necessity than greed, but it was not long before the order was reversed. In fact, it was greed that served to signal the start of her acquaintance with the Middle East as the key to Britain's vast empire (some one million and a quarter square miles). She secured Afghanistan at India's northern hemisphere, and Burma to the far eastern side - third Burmese war in 1885 until Burma was absorbed into India - Britain also possessed Cyprus on the Mediterranean in order to protect India from Czar intervention. Russia; as far as Britain was concerned, had to remain encroached within the shores of the Black Sea; she was not permitted to gain access to the `warm waters'. Never!
Britain toyed with the Ottoman Empire and used all possible nefarious means to ingratiate herself to despotic Sultans simply to keep away the Czars of Russia from repossessing Constantinople - once upon a time the center of Byzantine.
France, too, had her eyes fixed on the Orient.
Since the early days of the 1800's, Napoleon's politics had been built on an indoctrinated theory that the less exactness we offered the more room for maneuver preferred to leave as much unsaid as possible. The more of false hopes we gave, the less France would be obliged to oblige. For example Napoleon went to the extremes by declaring himself a Mohammedan in order to imbibe the el-Azhar (Moslem Shrine) to win over the Egyptians' support in his quest for supremacy over Egypt. Thus far, however, Napoleon had been able to stem the tidal wave of public outrage without dampening the soles of his shoes when he established secret channels with the Ottoman Sultan - the Caliphate.
This competition between two major universal powers did its work like yeast in a lump of dough, it began to take effect and the political geography of the Middle East was one that one must not ignore the immense tract of mainly barren lands called the Arabian Peninsula.
The Arabs, who for centuries had been `subjected' to the Ottoman autocratic ruling methods under the `banner' of `Islam', could feel the opposing (and confusing) schools of diplomacy between the French and the English in their approach to gain a permanent foothold in Arabia.
The Arabs could see a radical difference between the character of the French and the methods of the English. The former will not hesitate to sacrifice the future for the fulfillment of present desires. The latter moves slowly weighing carefully all the facts, the pros and cons, and, before acting, determines what course of action will be most to serve Britain's interests in the end. They're not in a hurry and can wait and wait, until the opportune moment presents itself.
This way France was acting without thoughtful reflection whereas England was mainly considering the final results.
The Suez Canal was England's initial impetus. What started teeth rattling at home was the shrewd ideas of giving Britain full control of the Red Sea route to India and the Far East, whatever the cost might be, they have the manpower -the Indians - to execute and the brains - the British - to command. No one can blame them, after all the British, like Napoleon, were using the Moslem Indians (later Pakistan) to fight wars in `Belaad el Muslimin' - Muslim Lands. Britain now was the Angel Guardian of the Muslimin.
The first step: London agreed to make the southeast corner of the Mediterranean the most vital strategic spot in the Empire. Henceforth the Holy Land became its military left flank, even Egypt and the Sudan became its right flank and were accordingly occupied in the eighties of the nineteenth century.
London sent specialized Royal Engineers to map Palestine in the interests of Biblical research. Britain's role this time was the Angel Guardian of the Jews, but who toyed with whom?
The second step: the guarantee of Turkey-in Asia under the Cyprus Convention was extremely vital. It meant that Britain now recognized as preeminent her interests in the Palestine area, and it led eventually to her occupation under a variety of mandates after WWI.
Cyprus Convention reverberated like a sonic boom throughout the British Empire and reached all related communities, notably the Muslims.
Guarantees to Cyprus meant a willingness to fight for Cyprus; actually such was (and still is) the common parlance that a fight is looming. (The same language Britain used when she 'guaranteed' Poland in 1939).
As Britain turned cold shoulder to protestations across Europe, France began expressing fears over the shifting balance of power over the Middle East until she threw the towel.
The Cyprus Convention marked the point at which Britain could foretell that the region including Palestine was worth a war if it should come; that neither the age of the Claim, nor the fact that the tradition does not accord with the Biblical narrative seemed to weaken in the least the blind faith of the simple believers.
But how the Cyprus Convention did work?
Russia, the aggressor against whom Convention was directed, was depressed and moved to lower priority because, by the end of the nineteenth century, Russia had been superseded by Germany as Britain's chief imperial rival. When WWI came, the war was fought whose outcome was to make Britain the inheritor of the Ottomans in Asia and the occupier of Palestine. The war was not fought against Russia in support of Turkey, but against Germany and Turkey itself.
Throughout one full century before WWI, wars between Europeans were fought based on Expansion and Greed, whereas for the Middle and Far East new countries were mapped based on Religion and Creed.
How could such European competing powers agree in 1919 Peace Conference in Paris? Conducting a Peace Conference with the same expansionist and irredentist mentality of the Cyprus Conference! Here we could see much hope and expectation from Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points as conceived by young countries that were living quietly, without ostentation bordering on diffidence.
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